Recommended textbook solutionsU.S. History1st EditionJohn Lund, Paul S. Vickery, P. Scott Corbett, Todd Pfannestiel, Volker Janssen 567 solutions By the People: A History of the United States, AP EditionJames W. Fraser 496 solutions The American Nation, Volume 29th EditionPrentice Hall 865 solutions Western Heritage Since 1300, AP Edition12th EditionDonald Kagan, Frank M. Turner, Steven Ozment 490 solutions The Iran Hostage Crisis rter hoped that the Camp David ccords would usher in a new era of cooperation in the Middle East. Yet, events in Iran showed that troubles in the region were far from over. Since the 1950s, the United States had supported the rule of the Shah, or emperor, of Iran. In the 1970s, however, oppostion to the Shah began to grow within Iran.Dying of cancer, the Shah fled from Irna in January 1979. Fundamentalist Islamic clerics, led by the Ayatollah Khomeini, took power. Carter allowed the Shah to enter the United States to seek medical treatment. Enraged Iranian radical students invaded the U.S. Embassy and took 66 Americans as hostages. The Khomeini government then took control of both the embassy and the hostages to defy the United States. The hostage crisis consumed the attention of Carter during the last year of his presidency. To many Americans, Carter's failure to win all of the hostages' release was evidence of American weakness. As Peter Bourne put it in his biography of Jimmy Carter, "Because people felt that Carter had not been tough enough in foreign policy...some bunch of students could seize American diplomatic officials and hold them prisoner and thumb their nose at the United States." The hostage crisis began to change the way Americans viewed the world outside their borders. Nuclear war between the two superpowers was no longer the only threat to the United States. Although the Cold War still concerned Americans, the threats posed by conflicts in the Middle East threatened to become the greatest foreign policy challenge of the United States. During the 1970s, the United States classified Iraq as a state sponsor of terrorism stemming fromIraqi support of militant Palestinian groups. American policymakers were further antagonized by Iraq's cultivation of close ties with the Soviet Union, which provided Baghdad with most of its military technology. But, in
1977, President Jimmy Carter (in office, 1977-1981) explored a rapprochementwith Iraq in the hope of moderating the Ba'athist regime and fortifying American influence in the Persian Gulf and broader Middle East. Carter expected to steer Iraq away from the Soviet orbit and toward a more moderate, pro-Western course. Such a conciliation between the two nations would potentially lead to greater Iraqi cooperation in stabilizing regional affairs andaverting further Soviet gains in the region. During the
1990s, Osama bin-Laden, a wealthy former Saudi national, emerged as a financial sponsor, director, and "spiritual" leader of a vast Islamist terrorist network. Bin-Laden was a self-styled "emir" of the militant Sunni Islamic, multi-national al-Qaeda organization. Al-Qaeda—meaning "the Base"—was founded by bin-Laden and other Arab nationalists in 1988, during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda ideologues have advocated the ouster of foreign influences in Muslim nations and the
establishment of a caliphate (an Islamic theocracy) ruling the Muslim world. In 1999, President Clinton issued an executive order declaring the Taliban Afghan regime as a state sponsor of terrorism and imposed economic sanctions against Afghanistan. Fundamentally, the Libyan intervention was hastily engineered, with little or no cohesive military planning or clear political objectives. In 2016, the British Foreign Affairs Select
Committee concluded that Gaddafi's threat to civilians had been exaggerated by Libyan anti-government rebels and observers outside Libya, namely in France and the Arab League, whohad advocated regime change. Indeed, except for attempts to suppress sporadic anti-government uprisings, no substantive evidence surfaced that Gaddafi had planned indiscriminate violence against civilians. More seriously, the British investigation determined that poor intelligence failed to recognize a significant
Islamic extremist element among the ranks of the anti-Gaddafi rebels. Students also viewed |