Which of the following statements best describes the impact of ideologically oriented programming?

A political ideology is a set of ideas, beliefs, values, and opinions, exhibiting a recurring pattern, that competes deliberately as well as unintentionally over providing plans of action for public policy making in an attempt to justify, explain, contest, or change the social and political arrangements and processes of a political community. The concept of ideology is subject to partly incompatible conceptual interpretations. The Marxist tradition views it pejoratively as distorted consciousness, reflecting an exploitative material reality, that can be overcome through unmasking; or, more recently, as a fictitious narrative necessary to maintaining the social order. Non-Marxist approaches split into three perspectives. The first sees ideology as abstract, closed and doctrinaire, largely impervious to empirical evidence and superimposed on a society. The second sees ideology as a series of empirically ascertainable attitudes towards political issues that can be explored by means of behavioral methods. The third views ideologies as indispensable mapping devices of cultural symbols and political concepts that constitute a crucial resource for understanding and shaping sociopolitical life. They compete over the ‘correct’ and legitimate meanings of political words and ideas, and by means of that control, over the high ground of politics.

Conclusion

Neoliberal political ideology underpins much of the recent change to state steering of higher education. For example, the neoliberal political philosophy, with its emphasis on the market and light state surveillance, is clearly evident in both the supermarket and evaluative state models. The supermarket and evaluative state models emphasize the state's supervisory function without tight, detailed control of institutions, as well as the self-regulatory nature of higher education institutions based on strong executive leadership and the efficiency of resource utilization and management. These models and approaches are to a significant degree illustrative of current higher education trends in Australia, Western Europe, and Japan. The state's roles in the evaluative state model, in theory, encapsulate the idea of the separation of funder and provider, and policy and delivery.

The evaluative state thesis identifies evaluation – in particular, output rather than input and process quality control – as the government's main policy instrument in the postroutine evaluation regime and in the context of scarce public resources. A posteriori evaluation as well as financial incentives are common policy instruments currently in use in Western European countries and Japan. In this respect, it can be argued that the higher education systems in these countries are converging on the evaluative state model.

The higher education system can be understood as a subsystem of the nation-state system. It can also be understood as a part of a state education system – which is “a nationwide and differentiated collection of institutions devoted to formal education, whose overall control and supervision is at least partly governmental, and whose component parts and processes are related to one another” (Archer, 1984: 19) – regardless of whether individual institutions are public or private. However, challenge to traditional state steering models and approaches in higher education have also arisen from new global and regional trends, such as the Bologna process. Meek (2002) identifies the global dimension – including international higher education consortia such as Universities 21 (a network of 18 leading research universities in ten countries) and supranational coordination authorities such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World Bank, and the European Union – and attempts to incorporate it into the concept of higher education coordination. These supra-national actors and agreements affect the choices which government can make, which in turn changes the mode of higher education coordination.

In the final analysis, the steering of higher education is observed within the nation-state system. The role of the state has been modified by various forces and trends and is not the same in all countries. However, in the end, it is the state that is supreme. For example, education and training fall under the principle of subsidiarity in the European Union. The Bologna Declaration, which is a multinational agreement initiated by education ministers of individual countries, relies upon its implementation by the government of each nation-state. The steering of higher education remains the state's prerogative, with the exact form that steering assumes being dependent on a variety of national political and ideological factors.

Anarchists/Ecoterrorists

Anarchism, a political ideology that reached America from 19th century Europe, opposed centralized government and favored the poor and working class. Martin (2003: 38–39) argues that anarchists were among the first anti-establishment radicals who opposed both capitalism and Marxism and advocated revolution, although they never offered a plan for replacing a central government. Anarchism in the United States was linked to the labor movement and the advocacy of a bombing campaign against industry and government (Combs, 2003: 163).

The Ecoterror movement in the United States focuses on both the dangers of humans encroaching on nature and preserving wilderness. The FBI (2002) defines ecoterrorism as the use or threatened use of violence of a criminal nature against innocent victims or property by an environmentally oriented, subnational group for environmental-political reasons or aimed at an audience beyond the target, often of a symbolic nature.

Ted Kaczynski (A.K.A. the Unabomber) was a modern day ecoterrorist. He was an anti-industrialist who targeted scientists and engineers. In 1996 he was arrested after a 17-year investigation that involved 16 bombings, including three deaths and many injuries. Upon pleading guilty in federal court, he is now serving a life sentence without the possibility of release.

Two major domestic ecoterrorist groups are the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and the Earth Liberation Front (ELF). The Federal Bureau of Investigation (2011 and 2002) estimates that ALF and ELF have committed over 600 criminal acts in the United States, resulting in damage exceeding tens of millions of dollars in losses. Arson is the most destructive practice of ALF and ELF.

ALF is committed to ending the abuse and exploitation of animals. They seek to cause economic loss or destruction of the victim company’s property. Victims include fur companies, mink farms, restaurants, and animal research laboratories.

ELF promotes “monkeywrenching,” a euphemism for acts of sabotage and vandalism against companies that are perceived to be harming the environment. An example is “tree spiking,” in which metal spikes are hammered into trees to damage logging saws.

8.2 Distinguishing social and economic ideology

The ECF focuses on political ideology in unidimensional and general terms (i.e., overall resistance or support for change). Some scholars have argued that ideology can also be represented in a multidimensional manner where attitudes toward social (e.g., abortion) and economic (e.g., taxation) issues are specified as distinct constructs (Lipset, 1959). Empirically, political attitudes often load onto two factors that have been classified as social and economic dimensions (Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Johnston & Ollerenshaw, 2020). However, the literature has also provided varying results concerning the strength and direction of the relationship between these dimensions (Azevedo, Jost, Rothmund, & Sterling, 2019; Benoit & Laver, 2006; Malka, Lelkes, & Soto, 2019). Further, there is a lack of conceptual clarity in whether various issues (e.g., welfare, environmental regulations) can be classified as “social” or “economic” (Gilens, 1995; Song et al., 2020). These challenges raise questions about how distinct these dimensions are from one another.

Despite these potential issues in examining ideology as multidimensional, researchers have begun to address whether psychological motivations are differentially linked to social and economic political views. Findings indicate that epistemic motivations (e.g., motives for closure and certainty) are consistently associated with more politically conservative (versus liberal) views on social issues (Costello & Lilienfeld, 2021; Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Malka et al., 2014). Given that epistemic motives undergird the predictions of the ECF, I anticipate that social ideology would contribute to patterns of categorization and evaluation that mirror those reviewed here. In contrast, there is considerable variability in whether epistemic motives are associated with economic liberalism or conservatism (Federico & Malka, 2018; Malka & Soto, 2015; Sterling, Jost, & Pennycook, 2016). Some findings suggest that political engagement contributes to explaining this variability, such that people who are more engaged often display a link between epistemic goals and economically conservative views (Czarnek & Kossowska, 2021; Johnston, Lavine, & Federico, 2017). Thus, it is possible that the ECF's predictions also apply to economic ideology, but only among people high in political engagement.

4.1.2 Political Ideology

The extensive and growing literature on political ideology led Shook and Fazio (2009) to hypothesize that ideology may be associated with sampling behavior and the subsequent emergence of an asymmetry in the learning of positive versus negative attitudes. Considerable evidence suggests that political conservatives tend to perceive the world as more dangerous or threatening than do liberals and that political liberals tend to be more open to new experiences than are conservatives (see Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003, for a review). Such findings imply that there may be a fundamental difference in the way that political conservatives and liberals choose to explore novel environments and test new stimuli. Shook and Fazio (2009) tested this possibility in a study involving the contingent feedback version of BeanFest. Politically conservative participants pursued the game in a more cautious manner. They approached fewer beans during the course of the game than politically liberal participants did (r = − 0.30). When their understanding of the various game beans was later tested, politically conservative participants exhibited better learning of the negative beans than the positive beans, compared to politically liberal participants (who learned about the two valences more equally). The relation between political ideology and the asymmetry in the learning of the game beans (r = − 0.28) was fully mediated by the differential sampling behavior during the game. That is, political conservatives approached fewer stimuli, thus gaining less information, than liberals. As such, they were unable to correct negative misconceptions, which resulted in their relatively poorer identification of positive stimuli, compared to liberals.

Presumably, the more extensive sampling behavior displayed by the more liberal individuals stemmed from their being characterized by more positive valence weighting proclivities. A more recent study involving the full-feedback implementation of BeanFest provided the opportunity to assess the weighting bias variable via our standard measurement system (Shook & Clay, 2014). Participants who endorsed more conservative political beliefs exhibited a significantly more negative weighting bias than those who endorsed more liberal political beliefs (r = − 0.22). That is, when classifying the novel beans, political conservatives weighted resemblance to negative game beans relatively more heavily than resemblance to positive game beans, compared to political liberals.

In sum, we have reviewed a variety of evidence from the BeanFest paradigm indicating that selective sampling behavior in novel environments can lead to an asymmetry in attitude learning. In doing so, we also explicated the connection between the weighting bias and sampling behavior. In essence, individuals’ valence weighting tendencies are a major contributor to their exploratory behavior. Those with a more positive weighting bias (and those who are more politically liberal) are more likely to approach and fully test a novel environment, thereby learning the true value of stimuli, and therefore obtaining a more accurate understanding of them. They are less likely to show an asymmetry in learning in a context in which the acquisition of information is contingent on approach behavior. They will also, however, be more likely to incur negative outcomes along the way as they sample more stimuli that turn out to be negative. Those with a more negative weighting bias (and those who are more politically conservative) are more likely to avoid novel stimuli within an environment, not learn the true value of stimuli, and show an asymmetry in learning such that, upon leaving an environment, they may mistakenly believe that environment to include relatively more negative stimuli than positive ones. They are, on the other hand, also less likely to incur negative outcomes along the way.

6.3 Political Ideology

How is it determined, for example, that an individual can control some plight, or that another has or does not have aptitude, and so forth? Earlier the “Kelley cube” was introduced, which includes social norms and past behavior as two important sources of causal information. As was indicated earlier, I engaged in relatively little research on this issue. But in one extended research direction, I considered the role of political ideology as an antecedent of causal inferences.

My foray into political ideology came about when considering reactions to stigmas, particularly poverty. It is known that liberals, or those on the left of the political spectrum, more support welfare and social programs than do conservatives, or those on the right regarding political beliefs. Attribution theory as already presented provides the possible intervening steps between political ideology and help giving. If liberals see the cause of poverty as more uncontrollable by needy others than do conservatives, then they would react to this need with greater sympathy and in turn be more positive toward help giving than would conservatives. Or conversely, if conservatives see the cause of poverty more controllable by needy others than do liberals, then they would react to this need with greater anger, less sympathy and in turn be less positive regarding welfare and other forms of help giving.

My associates and I explored the relations between political ideology, perceived causation, emotional reactions, and social attitudes toward the poor in a variety of studies including both self- and other-perception. In the most straight-forward research, individuals merely indicated their self-designated political label; provided their attitudes toward the poor, including the perceived cause of this state; and revealed their emotional reactions (anger and sympathy) and decisions regarding self- and/or governmental-help. Related research asked participants their opinions about how others labeled as liberals and conservatives react toward the poor. Again the usual paths were reported, as captured by the following sequences:

Liberal respondent—Cause of poverty (illness, no jobs)—Causal dimension (uncontrollable; person not responsible)—Emotion (sympathy more than anger)—Behavior (help)

Conservative respondent—Cause of poverty (laziness, lack of thrift)—Causal dimension (controllable; person responsible)—Emotion (anger more than sympathy)—Behavior (do not help)

The disparate perceptions of causality exhibited by liberals and conservatives extend beyond poverty to other stigmas and even to the causes of school failure, where conservatives blame lack of effort more than do liberals. The metaphor of the liberal as a nurturing mother and the conservative as a strict father are apt and consistent with an attribution analysis.

Final thoughts

Private enterprises and the voluntary transactions they engage in encourage respect and dignity and help change the image of the poor. ‘If we stop thinking of the poor as victims or a burden and start recognizing them as resilient and creative entrepreneurs and value-conscious consumers, a whole new world of opportunity will open up’ (Prahalad, 2005). The private sector is the best source of a job, or better yet choices of jobs, business opportunities and products one can voluntary choose to purchase in hopes of improving one’s life. With opportunities, the poor can make their own choices on how to earn a living and what type of lifestyle to lead. In a vibrant market economy, companies have to compete for employees, business partners and customers, and to retain any individual, wealthy or poor, as a customer, business partner or employee in an environment where choices are available requires treating the individual with respect and dignity.

We should also throw out any romantic notions about the nobility of the poor or assume all the world’s poor are victims of exploitation by greedy individuals or the system. Each individual living in poverty, like the rest of us, is an imperfect human who often makes poor choices. Domestic violence, drug abuse, alcoholism, and poor time and resource management can all be both the results and causes of poverty. No poverty reduction program ever designed has been able to prevent individuals from making poor choices. The poor should neither be completely blamed for their condition nor absolved of all responsibility for their condition. While the private sector has little direct control over the choices individuals make, it can provide additional career and purchasing options for individuals. Experience teaches us individuals when given additional choices are more likely to choose options which will help them achieve their life goals than to make ‘bad’ decisions. As long as individuals have free choice some will choose paths the majority of society feel are the wrong ones.

Poverty reduction should not become a political issue driven by political ideology, the issue is too important. Both the left and the right have at times pushed for protectionism or other misguided policies which have limited the poor from having opportunities to improve their lives. Poverty reduction should be an issue individuals from all political backgrounds can work together to achieve. Policies and ideas that have proven to be successful should be followed, regardless of their conformity to any particular political ideology.

One of the possible obstacles in developing conditions which can drive growth and poverty reduction in LDCs is fear. There are some factions in the developed world who are concerned ‘we’ and ‘our’ jobs are under threat from ‘them’ in the LDCs and ‘their’ low wages (Sachs, 2005). This attitude can lead to pressure to implement protectionist policies in developed economies. Moreover, this danger intensifies during economic downturns where scapegoats are sought by individuals and governments. However, history and academic research have consistently shown that economic success in the world is not a zero sum gain and that growth in LDCs can in fact help to drive growth in the developed world.

Private sector–driven poverty reduction can be a win–win situation for the poor and the rest alike.

5 From Paranoia to Empowerment Pedagogy

Bilingual education must be seen against the backdrop of conflicting political ideologies and different attitudes towards bilingualism in general. As pointed out by Brisk (1998, p. 1), ‘The paradox of bilingual education is that when it is employed in private schools for the children of elites throughout the world it is accepted as educationally valid […]. However, when public schools implemented education for language minority students over the past 50 years, bilingual education became highly controversial.’ Opponents of US bilingual education, in particular, view bilingualism not only as ‘a costly and confusing bureaucratic nightmare’ (Hayakawa 1992, p. 44) but also as likely to lead to political disloyalty and destabilization.

In his overview of the history of bilingual education in the USA, Baker (1996) distinguishes four overlapping periods characterized by (a) permissiveness, (b) restrictiveness, (c) opportunity, and (d) dismissal (see also Baker and Jones 1998, García 1997, Crawford 2001). Before World War I, tolerance of linguistic diversity prevailed. Many ethnic communities taught children in languages other than English. But the Nationality Act of 1906 required immigrants to the USA to learn English in order to become naturalized citizens. World War I and increased numbers of im-migrants led to calls for assimilation and Americanization (an attitude strongly reinforced by World War II) and to restriction of public-school instruction in languages other than English. This attitude relaxed in the wake of the Civil Rights and Equal Education movements and the growing interest in ethnic values and traditions. In addition, the academic failure of limited English proficient children raised the issue of equal opportunity and compensatory measures. Courts mandated bilingual education for minority children; amendments to Education Acts made federal funds available. The dismissive period starting in the 1980s took another turn in favor of submersion and transition programs, supported by pressure groups such as US English, English First or English for the Children (see respective websites).

From an international perspective, bilingualism and bilingual education have a more promising future, with countries envisioning themselves as global players aware of their need for interculturally competent mediators. Israel, for example, has moved from submersion to a successful multilingual curriculum. Within the European Community, new employment opportunities have led to an increasing demand for internationally accredited degrees and to recognition of the desirability of L2 skills. More and more parents of majority children are seeking bilingual programs at the nursery and primary school levels. While the current focus is on internationally marketable languages (and the languages of immediate neighbors, as along the border of France and Germany), it is to be expected that this interest will reinforce bilingualism in general and contribute to the development of effective pedagogical concepts of empowerment for majority and minority children alike.

1 Radicalism is a Relationship Term not a Content Term

Radicalism is, like conservatism (see Conservatism: Theory and Contemporary Political Ideology), a relationship term not a content term. It describes not any particular set of aspirations and aversions, but a distance between what exists and what is desired, and the way in which proposed changes are justified. Its particular character is therefore dependent on the historical circumstances in which it exists. Views put forward by radicals in Communist China might be shared by conservatives in Connecticut; the radicalism of California might be the traditionalism of Catalunya. Hannah Arendt's observation that the ‘most radical revolutionary will become a conservative on the day after the revolution’ may thus describe not only a change of heart following the acquisition of power, but a change in the relationship between a substantive policy which remains consistent, but which moves from opposition to implementation.

3.1.4 The multiple dimensions of politics and prejudice