Which of the following criminologist is credited with the development of the theory of criminal activism?

Motivations of Threat Agents, the Attackers

What motivates people to act as they do vis-à-vis threats to corporate assets? Obviously, there are about as many motivations and rationalizations as there are people who threaten the corporate assets, as our case study indicated. Many of the motivations would keep psychiatrists, criminologists, sociologists, and psychologists busy for centuries; and that is not an exaggeration, because studies on these types of “human frailties” have already been taking place for centuries.

Criminologists and others have had theories for years as to why people commit crimes. It has been looked at based on race, sex, age, environment, and the list goes on. The fact is, no one has found the answer but theories abound, including:3

Anomie theory: This theory was the idea of Emile Durkeim in 1893. This theory was based on the idea that there was a breakdown of norms that governed behavior.

Differential association: This theory looks at deviant or criminal behavior as it is “transmitted from one generation to another and from one ethnic group to another that may replace it in an urban neighborhood.” Edwin Sutherland theorized in 1937 that such behavior is learned. He believed that “people that have an intense emotional relationship at an early age with individuals who hold favorable attitudes towards breaking the law are more likely to break the law themselves…”

Labeling theory: This theory relates to “the ability of some groups to impose a label of ‘deviant’ on certain other members of society.” An example may be a group called freedom fighters by some and called terrorists by others.

CSMs should understand the many theories relative to criminal behavior, since it will help provide them with information that can be used when developing a corporate assets protection program. After all, they must know not only whom they are protecting the assets from but also must try to understand what motivates threat agents to attack4 the corporate assets.

Some of the motivations can be grouped into categories, which include the following (can you name other categories?):

Revenge for not getting a promotion or perceived proper recognition

Furthering a political agenda such as save the whales and trees

Nationalistic economic pressures such as helping the nation-state gain global, economic power

Greed—simply wanting material wealth but not being willing to work hard for it.

Man-made threat agents to corporate assets can be anyone—under the right circumstances.

Summary

Criminologists are no strangers to the idea of theoretical integration. Indeed, integrative criminology is a thriving cottage industry in its own right (see Barak, 1998), with Henry and Einstadter (2006) identifying at least 16 integrated theories currently in play in criminology. Theorists in criminology also recognize a range of different integration theories including various forms of propositional and conceptual integration (see Henry, 2012; Muftic, 2009 for details). Muftic (2009) argues that the integration of microlevel and macrolevel theoretical approaches in criminology has been relatively unexplored, although recent efforts by Messner (2012) to integrate institutional anomie theory (a macrolevel theory) with situational action theory (a microlevel theory) suggests that multilevel theoretical integration is a fruitful area for further work in criminology, as it is in other academic fields (e.g., Jepperson & Meyer, 2011; Thagard, 2012). As Agnew (2011a) notes, however, no integrated theory in criminology has achieved much recognition; he argues that this is largely because there are ongoing disputes about the foundational assumptions on which theories are constructed. For example, different criminological theories vary in their views on whether humans: (1) can be said to possess agency or behavior that is fully determined; (2) are purely self-interested actors or largely community-minded and altruistic; (3) live in societies that are largely consensual or riven with conflict (Agnew, 2011a).

We agree with Agnew that it is essential to ensure that the underlying assumptions of different theoretical approaches are consistent with each other, and suggest that the evolutionary approach that we advocate in Chapter 3 provides some valuable resources to ensure that this is the case. Importantly, it provides the basis for understanding what kind of organisms we are (Chapter 5) and how our evolutionary history (both biological and cultural) has shaped the “nature of our nature” and the social and ecological contexts in which we are embedded. Our task in the remainder of this book is to demonstrate that this perspective, in conjunction with integrative pluralism, has value for criminology as a social science. Our vision for the study of crime is thus a revisionary one. We see little promise in the idea that there is one grand integrated theory of crime just waiting to be discovered (or, rather, constructed) and certainly do not want to argue that evolutionary theory provides the unifying theoretical framework that has so long been missing in criminology (and other sciences interested in the explanation of crime). Rather, we argue that clear thinking about explanation types (with due attention to evolution, function, development, and causation) and interlevel explanations (from intracellular to macrosocial processes) will encourage the development of mutually coherent and mutually informed theories that are more or less salient for addressing specific explanation-seeking “why” questions. The complex, dynamic nature of the world with its interlocking systems that interact across time, requires the adoption of a nuanced epistemological framework. In this chapter, we have suggested that Tinbergen’s evolutionary typology of causes, supplemented by Mitchell’s interlevel theory-building strategy (i.e., integrative pluralism) provides this framework.

Fraud: Deliberate Misuse or Misappropriation of a Company’s Resources, Often for Personal Gain

Human capital risks in this area occur across a wide sector of companies as well as at all levels in the organization but usually involve employees, possibly contractors, in a position of trust. These individuals may have access to internal corporate financial resources or have the ability to divert them. The assets may not only be financial but may be physical, with financial returns earned through a third party. It is not uncommon for fraud incidents to occur among individuals who have long service histories and who have thus built a trusting relationship with the company. As a result, evidence of the crime may not be exposed immediately. Under these circumstances, companies may be subject to overconfidence in their approach to incidents of fraud and become complacent in their prevention and detection methods. In such an environment, the classical “motive–means–opportunity” elements are present, but there is also the element of self-justification.

Famed criminologist Donald R. Cressey combined these elements into a hypothesis known as the Fraud Triangle.3 Cressey’s work defines a model that contains three elements, all of which must be present and that together lead to fraudulent behavior:

Pressure: The motivation behind the crime: for example, “I have overwhelming debt and can’t see my way clear.”

Opportunity: The ability to use a position of trust with little perceived risk of being caught: “I’m a long-term employee”; “My performance is above reproach.”

Rationalization: Justification of the crime based on personal ethical values: “I’m borrowing the money”; “I need it for my family”; “The work this company does is harmful to…”

Fraud in the management of human capital is a violation of trust that can lead to financial loss, brand and reputational damage, legal and regulatory issues, and changes in shareholder value. To prevent fraud, the elements of “pressure” and, to some degree, “rationalization” are better addressed through the more traditional human capital processes such as employee assistance plans, development plans, promotion policies, and other retention plans. The element of “opportunity” can be addressed through a review of security policies, internal financial controls, and strict policies on vendor management and procurement practices.

Conclusions: As Criminology Meets the Forensic Realm

As we conclude this chapter, we wish to state that a forensic criminologist’s investigation and testimony should have five basic elements or components. First, expert investigation and testimony should produce case-specific evidence derived from social science principles. Second, expert investigations should be thorough and relevant to assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in a case. Third, expert investigation and testimony should reflect mainstream disciplinary knowledge and draw on extant scholarship to develop case-specific opinions and evidence. Fourth, in their expert witness reports and testimony at deposition and trial, forensic criminologists should develop explanations that begin with middle-range theories and evolve toward substantive theories or ad hoc explanations of the etiology of the criminal event and the relationship of the event to the larger socio-spatial context (Blaikie, 2000; Bourgeois, 1979; Merton, 1968). In the work of Robert Merton, middle-range theory starts its theorizing with delimited aspects of social phenomena rather than with a broad, abstract entity such as society or social system. Theories of the middle-range are firmly backed up by observed data and have a limited conceptual range. Neither judges nor attorneys will be impressed with the jargon of grand theory. Moreover, highly abstract theorizing in which the formal organization and arrangement of concepts takes priority over understanding the facts of a case will be received quite lukewarmly in the lawyer’s office and will mystify and confuse the jury.

Fifth, forensic criminologists should write their reports for lay audiences and minimize the use of complex and complicated scientific language. We recognize that this can be a challenge. A scientist’s specialized knowledge can sometimes be a hindrance to effective communication with a lay audience. Successful lay communication requires that the expert anticipate the audience’s (e.g., jury’s) knowledge or perspective on the subject. One strategy to enhance communication to a lay audience is to present the findings and conclusions first, answering why and how questions, and then communicate more detailed background information later.

Forensic criminologists should best approach juries in a manner appropriate for an introductory social science course rather than as one might teach a graduate seminar for aspiring academic sociologists and criminologists. Experts must beware of being caught up in highly technical lingo or statistical elaboration lest they lose the attention of jurors and judges alike. In short, an effective witness will act as an educator rather than a lecturer. As Dvoskin and Guy (2008, p. 209) put it,

Experts by definition are well-educated people, but the effective expert will not try to put this on display. In short, be humble and be simple. Most experts want the jury to realize how smart the expert is; but the most effective experts want the jury to realize how smart the jury is. This means explaining one’s opinion, and the inferences and evidence on which they are based, clearly and in English. The expert who educates the trier of fact is able to convince instead of impress. If the judge or jury truly understands and agrees with the evidence and logic that form the basis of the inferences and opinions, then the expert will have excelled. “Blowing them away” with complicated verbiage and sophisticated theories just encourages juries to dismiss an expert’s input.

Finally, we wish to express to the reader that, as a general principle, the law expects forensic criminologists and other expert witnesses to be staunch supporters and promoters for their methodology. The forensic criminologist’s role is to present evidence relevant to his or her expertise and not to champion for a given verdict. These points are entirely consistent not only with the rules and standards of admissibility of expert testimony, but also with the methods of scientific inquiry.

Criminalistics and Forensic Criminology

Forensic criminologists are not criminalists. Criminalists practice criminalistics, which is a field of forensic investigation that emphasizes individualization and pattern matching, for example, the effort to associate a crime scene mark or object with its source. Criminalistics involves the comparison of fingerprints, handwriting, bitemarks, voiceprints, toolmarks, firearms, tire prints, shoe prints, and so on. The goal of criminalistics investigation is to link a latent fingerprint, a writing, a bitemark, a bullet, or similar objects to the one and only finger, writer, teeth, gun, or other specific object that made the markings. The objective of forensic identification science is individualization, “[t]he process of placing an object in a category which consists of a single, solitary unit. Individualization implies uniqueness” (Thornton and Peterson, 2008, p. 71). The crime scene investigation techniques of individualization and pattern matching are popular within the forensic fields of fire, arson and explosives, gunshot residue, comparative bullet lead analysis, and aspects of forensic pathology. While many forensic criminologists have a basic understanding of criminalistics they seldom develop such a mastery as to consider themselves experts in its practice.

There are four major differences between forensic criminologists and criminalists.

First, forensic criminologists conduct thorough, objective, and detailed investigations using the scientific method. They use social science techniques to make observations, formulate hypotheses, gather data to test hypotheses, and develop theories and explanations of crime events. In contrast, the subfields and investigative techniques of criminalistics have come under heated criticism in recent years with critics stigmatizing them as “nonscience” approaches (Saks and Faigman, 2008, p. 168). According to an oft-cited National Research Council (NRC) (2009) report, in nonscience forensic disciplines, “forensic science professionals have yet to establish either the validity of their approach or the accuracy of their conclusions, and the courts have been utterly ineffective in addressing this problem” (p. 109). The NRC report found that “no forensic method has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence and a specific individual or source” (p. 7). “The simple reality,” as noted by the NRC, “is that the interpretation of forensic evidence is not always based on scientific studies to determine its validity” (pp. 7, 8). Saks and Faigman (2008) point out that criminalistics investigators rarely use the scientific method in their research or submit their findings for peer review.

Second, forensic criminological research is theoretically driven with explanations of crime events tied directly to theoretically derived propositions. A criminological theory is a set of two or more propositions in which concepts—terms that we use to classify and categorize knowledge about the social world—refer to social phenomena that researchers assume to be causally related. While not all criminologists may accept this definition verbatim, many criminologists share the sentiments this definition of theory expresses. A theory describes the relationship between component concepts and propositions depict relationships in a causal fashion. A theory’s scope conditions include the time and place within which the phenomenon (crime event) supposedly occurred. A theory’s units of analysis may be the actual crime event, individuals (e.g., offenders, victims, place managers), complex organizations, small groups, laws, sociolegal regulations, and so on. Individualization and pattern matching do not address questions of causality or explain how and why questions about social phenomena. For social scientists and criminologists, theories must be capable of being put into proposition form if they are to qualify under a scientific definition of acceptable social science criminological theory.

Third, a forensic criminologist uses case evidence materials and criminological theories to develop statements about relationships among observable phenomena (e.g., the crime event and related contextual factors). In so doing, the forensic criminologist may apply different levels of analysis and deductive and inductive reasoning to understand the etiology of a crime event. Deduction is a form of reasoning that moves from the general to the specific, a top-down approach to understanding evidence. Inductive reasoning moves from specific observations to broader generalizations and theories, a bottom-up approach. In deductive reasoning, a criminologist might begin with a preexisting theory about a topic of interest in the legal case. She or he would then review the literature and develop more specific descriptions of crime phenomena that she or he can apply to the case and then evaluate using case-specific data and evidence. The process then narrows down even further when the investigator evaluates particular theoretical statements with specific observable data to confirm or disconfirm the original theories. In inductive reasoning, the forensic criminologist begins with specific observations and measures to detect patterns and regularities. She or he then formulates tentative statements that can be explored, and finally she or he ends up developing some general conclusions or theories about the crime event. Importantly, most forensic criminological research involves using both inductive and deductive reasoning processes in an investigation (for an overview of the use of inductive and deductive reasoning in forensic criminology, see Petherick and Ferguson, 2017).

Fourth, researchers and investigative journalists have drawn attention to the unsupported assumptions, exaggerated claims, and fraud that sometimes affect the subfields of criminalistics. Cole (2009, 2008a, b) suggests that the rules of practice that formed the basis for the authority and credibility of latent fingerprint examination (LFPE) during the 20th century have proven to be vulnerable to a contemporary resurgence of interest in establishing the scientific foundations of forensic evidence. As researchers have noted, the findings of criminalistics experts have been particularly vulnerable to cognitive and contextual bias. Dror and colleagues (2006) found that it is possible to alter identification decisions on the same fingerprint solely by presenting it in a different context (see also Dror and Charlton, 2006).

Turvey (2013) has documented a number of cases in which criminalists in criminal cases have deliberately offered fraudulent evidence to the courts. In 2015, the Justice Department and FBI formally acknowledged that nearly every examiner in an elite FBI forensic unit gave flawed testimony in almost all trials in which they offered evidence against criminal defendants over more than a two-decade period before 2000. According to the Washington Post, “[o]f 28 examiners with the FBI Laboratory’s microscopic hair comparison unit, 26 overstated forensic matches in ways that favored prosecutors in more than 95 percent of the 268 trials reviewed so far.” The errors were uncovered in a three-year review by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the Innocence Project. Over the years, investigations by the Wall Street Journal (1999), PBS Frontline (2012), and the Washington Post (2017) have exposed the forensic certification organization American College of Forensic Examiners Institute (ACFEI) as bogus purveyors of junk science in the business of fabricating inauthentic certifications such as “forensic consultant,” “forensic professional technologist,” and “certified medical investigator.” In 2014, the members of the American Board of Forensic Accounting, the advisory board behind the ACFEI’s Certified Forensic Accountant credential, unanimously resigned amid questions about the legitimacy of the credential and the organization behind it (Cohn, 2014). Given the accusations of fraud and deception, academics and legal practitioners are adopting a more critical attitude toward criminalistics, the way criminalistics evidence is introduced at trial, and the role pattern matching and individualization techniques play in convictions or acquittals once admitted. De facto deference to the weight ascribed to forensic evidence in the courtroom or indeed to the opinions of experts is becoming less common than in the past.

Finally, we can understand the problems and limitations of criminalistics by recognizing that the research culture in criminalistics is underdeveloped and lacks clear strategies for standard setting; managing accreditation and testing processes; and developing and implementing rulemaking, oversight, and sanctioning processes (Giannelli, 2017). The investigative techniques of individualization and pattern matching used in criminalistics often fail to meet recognized legal standards for scientific reliability including peer review and conscientious evaluation. Forensic examiners that employ pattern matching and individualization typically work in a law enforcement environment that is geared toward prosecuting criminal suspects, a concern that may be at odds with and even hostile toward the scientific method. Over the decades, forensic practices have been developed by law enforcement to assist in criminal investigations. Crime labs are often housed in police departments, staffed by police officials. Scholars and researchers suggest that these connections to police and prosecutors may compromise the independence of criminalists and could create frequent opportunities to inject biases into the investigation process (National Research Council, 2009).

In contrast, the research culture in forensic criminology is founded upon the scientific method and has strong and long-standing ties to the broader field of criminology and related social sciences—anthropology, economics, geography, psychology, and sociology—through national research and teaching communities, government funders, and professional organizations. Unlike the field of criminalistics, the forensic criminologist’s close connections to the social science disciplines mean that the research process is designed to follow quality control procedures to identify mistakes, fraud, and bias. In U.S. universities, graduate students in the social sciences are usually introduced to a series of training tools in their courses and research activities including conflicts of interest—personal, professional, and financial; policies regarding human subjects; mentor/mentee responsibilities and relationships; collaborative research including collaborations with industry; peer review; data acquisition management; research misconduct and policies for handling misconduct; responsible authorship and publication; the scientist as a responsible member of society; contemporary ethical issues in research; and the environmental and societal impacts of scientific research. These research training tools can provide guidance to the forensic criminologist in determining how well her or his specific plans for responsible conduct of research compare with the best practices accumulated over the past decades by the research training community.

Unilaterality of cause

Personality criminologists locate the smoking –gun for any crime inside the person. The unidirectional flow of behavior events proceeds either from without or within. If it comes from without, such as the checkbook lying visibly on the table, it may occasion theft and later writing a bad check (uttering and publishing). The stolen checks, after all, were only coincidental artifacts, according to the notion of lifelong criminals and the obviation of individual characteristics to understand the full deviance spectrum (Walters, 2012, 2104). Off the shoreline, and closer to bilateral thinking, was Wilson and Herrnstein's Net-Advantage Theory (1985). It is loosely based on operant and respondent conditioning principles in which personality “traits” (not behaviors) are reinforced to facilitate better emotional decisions in life. Underlying their inclusion of reinforcement is that crime is inherently rewarding, since it allows the action-taker to get something at little or no cost. That some people rewarded by criminal behavior are different from people unaffected by the enticements (motivating operations) of rewards. While lip-service is paid to learning theory, in a pseudo-empirical way, the logistics of net-advantage theory are still inferior to scientific paradigms employing the conventions of applied behavior analysis. A bilateral (behavioral) or multilateral (interbehavioral) approach does not presume antecedents and consequences impact a pack of behaviors called traits. Even in the behavioral vernacular when referring to a “class of response,” the experimental assumption is that each response in a class, no matter how similar, dependent or interdependent, operates as discrete units of action under similar, different, or contiguous stimulus conditions.

Conclusions

In cases of crime and security at commercial land uses and facilities, courts may expect forensic criminologists to opine on questions of crime foreseeability and security standards of care considering this foreseeability. A forensic criminologist may also address the causal relationship between any alleged breach of standards and the damages suffered by a plaintiff. We have discussed in previous chapters that it is important for forensic criminologists to understand local case law to identify the appropriate foreseeability test used by a court in a particular jurisdiction. As criminologists know, the best predictor of future crime is past crime, whether we are speaking of individuals or of locations (Chainey et al., 2008; Walters and DeLisi, 2013; Kennedy, 2006). The context of the specific environment in the face of crime risk and the use of various risk management strategies are, of course, contingent upon and unique to the commercial facility in question.

A forensic criminologist should not just rely purely on incidents that have been reported in the recent past to investigate the foreseeability of criminal acts. Emison (2013) suggests, “there can be many changes to or developments at or near the property to alter the analysis, such as a change in the use of a facility, new or inexperienced management, new construction, and rapid changes in the neighborhood’s character.” Just because a hotel is considered safe one year does not mean that hotel owners have no obligation to adapt to changes in the neighborhood. Sociodemographic conditions and spatial features of neighborhood can change dramatically in a short time. Hotel management should be aware of any major neighborhood changes. According to the court in the Timberwalk case:

The publicity surrounding the previous crimes helps determine whether a landowner knew or should have known of a foreseeable danger. A landlord often has actual knowledge of previous crimes occurring on the premises through tenants’ reports. Actual notice of past incidents strengthens the claim that future crime was foreseeable. However, unreported criminal activity on the premises is no evidence of foreseeability. Previous similar incidents cannot make future crime foreseeable if nobody knows or should have known that those incidents occurred. Property owners bear no duty to regularly inspect criminal records to determine the risk of crime in the area. On the other hand, when the occurrence of criminal activity is widely publicized, a landlord can be expected to have knowledge of such crimes.11

Even without prior similar crimes, premises owners do not get a free pass because foreseeability may be established in other ways. In the oft-cited case, Trammel Crow Central Texas v. Gutierrez, the court noted that a focus solely on foreseeability overlooks other factors that are pertinent to the existence and scope of a duty. These factors include the risk, likelihood of injury, and the consequences of placing the burden on the defendant.12 Leesfield and Peltz (2013) suggest, for example, a hotel’s recognition that it needs to hire security guards or take other safety precautions may help establish foreseeability.13 Security measures taken by the business owner prior to the criminal act may establish that the business owner foresaw criminal activity and had tried to guard against it.14 That said, in Lau’s Corp., Inc. v. Haskins, the court ruled that “undertaking measures to protect patrons does not heighten the standard of care; and taking some measures does not ordinarily constitute evidence that further measures might be required.”15 Likewise, where activities could be associated with criminal conduct, the premises can be put on notice of the need for security measures. As one of the previous cases that we discussed shows, employees’ observations of conduct or events immediately before the crime, such as a suspicious person in the wrong place, may also give rise to notice.

One court maintains that the possibility of a criminal event occurring is “present in almost every aspect of daily life,” and in that sense, “the possibility of a violent attack is always able to be foreseen.”16 Yet, decades of criminological research have shown that crime is not randomly distributed but tends to be concentrated at particular facilities, that is, the 80–20 rule. Moreover, a forensic criminologist should evaluate foreseeability on a continuum from high foreseeability to low foreseeability. Assessing the degree of foreseeability (as well violation of standard of care and causality) can be challenging. For a forensic criminologist, conjecture and speculative expert testimony are not admissible but absolute certainty is not required. A lesson in forming expert opinions is that forensic criminologists should aim to provide expert testimony that is stated to a reasonable degree of certainty. In the end, a forensic criminologist’s opinion is only as strong as the facts and data upon which it is based (i.e., the expert’s investigation).

International Association of Forensic Criminologists Criminal Profiler Professional Certification Act of 2013

Ratified June 23, 2013

Abstract

The International Association of Forensic Criminologists/Academy of Behavioral Profiling (IAFC/ABP) continues to be the cooperative work of forensic, behavioral, and investigative professionals. In its time, it has drafted, adopted, and refined the first professional code of ethics for criminal profilers; the first written criminal profiling guidelines; and the first profiling general knowledge exam. It has also passed a Professional Certification Act, which will be discussed in the next chapter. Efforts to improve these protocols are an ongoing commitment within the IAFC/ABP, as experience, research, and legal standards force continuous evolution.

Breach of Duty and Standards of Care

After considering the issue of duty to protect and the question of foreseeability, a forensic criminologist will consider whether a business owner defendant breached or violated the duty. A forensic criminologist will conduct an analysis of the breach of the duty of care by examining the presence or absence of “adequate security” at the premises. In a negligent security case, the plaintiff may allege that the defendant’s security (in)actions were negligent and in violation of the appropriate standard of care. Here, forensic criminologists should research any standards promulgated by various professional associations, the defendant’s own policies, community practices, and learned treatises. Most industries sponsor or support professional or trade associations whose purpose is to advance members’ interests. For example, the American Hotel and Lodging Association (AHLA) serves the hospitality industry. The International Council of Shopping Centers (ICSC) serves retailers and developers of varying sizes. The National Apartment Association (NAA) and the Institute of Real Estate Management (IREM) represent the interests of property managers of varying sizes. The National Association of Realtors (NAR) represents realtors, residential and commercial brokers, salespeople, property managers, appraisers, counselors, and others engaged in the real estate industry.

The forensic criminologist can begin by researching the appropriate standards of care for the relevant professional or trade organization. ASIS International is the organization for security professionals worldwide. ASIS International publishes standards on Chief Security Officer—An Organizational Model (CSO), Investigations (INV), Risk Assessment (RA), Security Management Standard: Physical Asset Protection (PAP), Supply Chain Risk Management: A Compilation of Best Practices (SCRM), and Workplace Violence Prevention and Intervention Standard (WPVI). ASIS International also publishes a “Private Security Service Providers Services” with standards dealing with quality of service, risk management, and protection of human rights in areas around the world where the rule of law has been weakened due to conflicts or natural disasters. ASIS International also publishes a “Resilience Series” with standards that address the risks of disruptive events and resilience management. Trade groups such as the British Security Industry Association and the United States Security Industry Association (SIA) represent security equipment manufacturers and service providers. Other specialty associations are concerned with security in specific institutional settings. The International Association for Healthcare Security and Safety and the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators are two such examples.

Other associations that provide specialized products may also offer standards or guidelines. For example, the National Association of Security Companies represents the interests of contract and proprietary security officer providers in all settings. The Illuminating Engineering Society of North America (IESNA) publishes comprehensive lighting standards. The National Parking Association and the Institutional and Municipal Parking Congress are two trade organizations whose members are knowledgeable of appropriate parking practices. Organizations such as the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM), the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), and Underwriters Laboratories (UL) are active in setting standards for security equipment.

Table 3.1 presents a listing of different types of standards that courts have used and followed over the years. A standard is a set of criteria, guidelines, and best practices that can be used to enhance the quality and reliability of products, services, or processes (ASIS International, 2012a, Security Management, Chapter 3). Many of the organizations listed in Table 3.1 publish materials and guidelines that provide checklists and standards to evaluate the adequacy of a security program.

Table 3.1. Types of Standards

Source: Kennedy (2006, pp. 129–133).

Security industry standards may address a product, service, or process. Regulations may require compliance with a standard. Table 3.2 provides a list of various types of security industry standards, benefits of standards, and a list of the major committees and associations that promulgate security standards. According to the ASIS International, there are more than 100 active standards relating to a broad range of security concerns, as of 2018.

Table 3.2. Security Industry Standards

Source: ASIS International, 2012a. Security Management; Legal Issues; Security Officer Operations; and Crisis Management. Protection of Assets (POA). Dennis Shepp. October 2017. “Certified Protection Professional (CPP) Certification Examination Review.”

A forensic criminologist’s analysis of the “breach of duty” should typically focus on the steps taken by the defendant to protect the plaintiff from, or warn the plaintiff about, the possibility of criminal activity. Purcell (2010, p. 13) lays out several issues frequently explored in security cases to determine breach of duty. These issues include the adequacy of door and window locks, adequacy of the lighting conditions, existence of video surveillance, presence of a security guard, existence of an intercom system, measures taken to adequately screen visitors or eject unruly visitors, and the existence of placards or signs warning about criminal activity. Related, Hewitt (2004, p. 2) suggests that plaintiffs may be able to establish breach of duty by showing how the property owner failed to follow industry standards for security at comparable commercial properties. Professional bodies, such as ASIS International, the American National Standards Institute, and the Illuminating Engineering Society of North America, promulgate industry standards for security. Landlords may be accused of violating industry standards by:

failing to perform criminal background checks on employees, particularly those who might have a direct impact on the security of the property, its tenants, or its invitees.

failing to properly screen new tenants, especially when other tenants have relied on such screening to enhance their security.

failing to inform tenants about security problems or criminal activities on or near the property.

failing to establish or follow security policies and procedures.

failing to seek the advice of law enforcement or independent consultants.

failing to provide or enhance patrols by security guards or other personnel such as the property manager.

failing to continually review lighting, fencing, entrances and exits, lock and barrier systems (both manmade and natural), identification systems, and closed-circuit TVs and other monitoring and alarm devices.

engaging in misleading advertising that overstates security measures.

A forensic criminologist can obtain security surveys of the property conducted in-house or by a security company, any reports or reviews of reports by the owner or property manager, and all the company’s policies and procedures, in order to compare this information to industry standards. Harris (2002, p. 2) suggests that the forensic expert should check to see if the property owner maintained written operating and security policies and procedures. “When a defendant adopts a policies-and-procedures manual, it has, in effect, set standards.” Use fact-witness depositions to determine whether personnel at the premises adhered to these policies. If employees’ practices do not meet the minimum standards set by the manual, they may have breached the standard of care. In the absence of published standards, the question becomes did the landholder act reasonably in light of the circumstances.

Attorneys, scholars, and the courts often disagree over the appropriate standards of care in different industries and much debate surrounds the efficacy of different security measures employed to protect invitees and deter offenders. Criminologists have raised concerns about relationships among crime prevention and social costs related to different forms of public area surveillance. In recent years, CCTV, improved street lighting, and the other major forms of public area surveillance have been the subject of several reviews to assess their unique as well as comparative effectiveness in preventing crime. For example, Clarke (2008) and Welsh and Farrington (2008) reviewed the effects of improved street lighting on crime. Ratcliffe (2006) and Welsh and Farrington (2009, 2014) reviewed the effects of public area CCTV on crime. Eck (2006) assessed the effectiveness of place managers and security guards, and Welsh and colleagues (2010) reviewed the effectiveness of place managers, security guards, and defensible space. Most of these reviews draw conclusions based on the highest-quality evaluation studies (i.e., experimental and rigorous quasi-experimental designs). Drawing on this research, Welsh and colleagues (2015) conclude that CCTV is effective primarily in car parks, improved street lighting is somewhat effective in city and town centers and residential/public housing communities, and the defensible space practice of street closures or barricades can be effective in inner-city neighborhoods.

Importantly, public area surveillance measures such as CCTV, improved lighting, security guards, place managers, and defensible space (e.g., street closures) are not panaceas in reducing crime. The evidence suggests that their crime prevention effectiveness varies by time and place. That is, these crime prevention tools appear to be more effective in some areas and less effective in other areas. Researchers and scholars have suggested that CCTV and improved street lighting can be more effective in reducing property (and vehicle) crimes than in reducing violent crimes. Street closure or barricade schemes can be effective in reducing both property and violent crimes. The weight of the evidence suggests that security guards may be effective as a crime control strategy when stationed in car parks and targeted at vehicle crimes. Whether security guards are effective at preventing crime in other circumstances and other premises remains to be seen. The effectiveness of place managers—people who perform a surveillance function by means of employment (bus drivers, parking lot attendants, train conductors, etc.)—in preventing crime is unknown. As Welsh and colleagues (2015, p. 116) conclude, “[t]hese less-than-conclusive statements about the effectiveness of security guards and place managers have everything to do with the small number of high-quality evaluations that have been carried out on these measures.”

Industry leaders and security professionals have long recognized the challenge of creating and applying universally consistent standards of protection across the diverse business types, land uses, and property forms in the United States. On the one hand, many industry leaders and security professionals would prefer a set of transparent and across-the-board standards that could be easily applied in all situations and at all places (Bates, 2007). On the other hand, properties are unique in their land-use configurations, crime risks, and security threats. An apartment building located in a dilapidated low-income neighborhood in the inner city may face different crime risks and security threats than another apartment located in a gated complex in an affluent suburb. Much research has revealed that foreclosures attract criminal activity, and with each percentage point increase in the rate of foreclosures, the rate of violent crime in the same area rises by more than 2% (Immergluck, 2006; Ellen et al., 2013). Thus, not all security measures will fit all business types and land uses. Each individual property will have unique security requirements.

In short, a forensic criminologist will face two major tasks concerning breach of duty in a negligent security case. First, she or he will have to investigate and determine what behavior should reasonably have been expected on the part of the defendant based on the foreseeability of the attack. Related, the forensic criminologist can research various standards promulgated by professional associations, defendant’s own policies, community practices, and learned treatises to evaluate whether the defendant followed the appropriate standard of care in the discharge of her or his duty to maintain a safe and secure premises. The second task is to determine whether the defendant violated any standards of care. In some cases, both plaintiff and defendant may agree on the appropriate standard of care. But they may disagree on whether the defendant actually breached the standard of care. Importantly, as we discuss below, a defendant will not become liable for negligence unless the plaintiff can show by a preponderance of evidence that the failure to act reasonably was causally related to the injuries sustained.