What type of grant issued by the federal government provides money for states to use at their discretion?

CDC awards financial assistance in the form of grants when there is not a demonstrated need for substantial agency involvement beyond normal oversight and monitoring activities throughout the life of the grant. CDC awards financial assistance in the form of cooperative agreements when CDC anticipates substantial involvement beyond normal oversight and monitoring activities. Specific activities are identified in the notice of funding opportunity (NOFO).

Further, CDC awards non-discretionary and discretionary grants. Non-discretionary grants are those that a federal agency is required by statute to award if the recipient, usually a state, submits an acceptable State Plan or application and meets the eligibility and compliance requirements of the statutory and regulatory provisions of the grant program. Discretionary grants permit the federal government, according to specific authorizing legislation, to exercise judgment, or “discretion,” in selecting the applicant/recipient organization, through a competitive grant process.

1.

Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799 (Jan. 30, 2017).

For additional information regarding "sanctuary jurisdictions," see CRS Report R44795, State and Local "Sanctuary" Policies Limiting Participation in Immigration Enforcement, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R44118, Sanctuary Jurisdictions and Criminal Aliens: In Brief, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Insight IN10653, Sanctuary Jurisdictions: Congressional Action and President Trump's Interior Enforcement Executive Order, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R44789, Sanctuary Jurisdictions and Select Federal Grant Funding Issues: In Brief, by [author name scrubbed].

See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987); Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).

See, e.g., Role of State Legislatures in Appropriating Federal Funds to States: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Gov't Affairs, Subcomm. on Intergov't Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Federal Assistance Reform: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Gov't Affairs, Subcomm. on Intergov't Relations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); Current Condition of American Federalism: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Gov't Operations, Subcomm. on Intergov't Relations and Human Resources,97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).

South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205-08 (1987) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 451 U.S. at 17).

Id. at 207-08 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 460 (1978)).

Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08.

Id. at 211; NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).

See supra note 3.

Portions of this section of the report have been adapted from CRS Report R44729, Constitutional Authority Statements and the Powers of Congress: An Overview, by [author name scrubbed] [hereinafter "CRS Constitutional Authority Statements report"].

Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 81 (1907); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819); see also CRS Constitutional Authority Statements report.

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2577; see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) ("Every law enacted by Congress must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution.").

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.

Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.

For example, the Court has recognized that Congress, through the Necessary and Proper Clause, has the power to enact legislation to implement U.S. treaty obligations, as such legislation may be necessary to give effect to the federal government's power to make treaties, which is found in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); Neely v. Hinkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901).

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.

United States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U. S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2496, 2503 (2013); United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 133 (2010).

Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 355 (1903).

See Comstock, 560 U.S. at 134 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819)).

Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 247 (1960) (emphasis in original).

For a discussion of other limits on Congress's powers beyond the principle of federalism, including separation of powers and individual rights, see CRS Constitutional Authority Statements report.

See U.S. Const. amend. X (providing that powers "not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people."); see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992) ("If a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred on Congress.").

Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363 (1907) ("Decisions of this court ... recognize the possession, by each state, of powers never surrendered to the general government; which powers the state, except as restrained by its own Constitution or the Constitution of the United States, may exert not only for the public health, the public morals, and the public safety, but for the general or common good, for the well-being, comfort, and good order of the people."); Hamilton v. Ky. Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 156 (1919) ("That the United States lacks the police power, and that this was reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment, is true."). See also Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976) ("The promotion of safety of persons and property is unquestionably at the core of the State's police power.... ").

New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161, 173 (1992).

Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).

505 U.S 144 (1992).

521 U.S. 898 (1997).

See New York, 505 at 155-160 (discussing the division of sovereignty in the federalist system, and stating that although "[t]he actual scope of the Federal Government's authority with respect to the States has changed over the years ... the constitutional structure underlying and limiting that authority has not"); Printz, 521 U.S. at 518 ("It is incontestible that the Constitution established a system of 'dual sovereignty.'"). The Court identified this distinction between the federal and state governments as advancing multiple goals, including better ensuring the political accountability of these governments and reducing the risk of tyranny that might result with the concentration of power in a single sovereign. Printz, 521 at 920-921; New York, 505 at 181-183.

Not every requirement imposed by the federal government upon state or local government entities and officials necessarily violates the anti-commandeering principles identified in Printz and New York, though. A number of federal statutes provide that certain information collected by state entities must be reported to federal agencies. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5779 (providing that, when a missing child report is submitted to a state or local law enforcement agency, that agency shall report the case to the National Crime Information Center of the Department of Justice). For discussion of various federal reporting requirements applicable to states, see Robert A. Mikos, Can States Keep Secrets from the Federal Government?, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 103 (2012). The Printz Court expressly declined to consider whether these requirements were constitutionally impermissible. Moreover, the Court distinguished reporting requirements from the case before it in Printz, which the Court viewed as involving "the forced participation of the States ... in the actual administration of a federal program." Printz, 521 U.S. at 918. See also id. at 936 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (describing the Court as having refrained "from deciding whether other purely ministerial reporting requirements imposed by Congress on state and local authorities pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers are similarly invalid"). For criticism of the distinction made by the Printz Court between reporting requirements and situations where the federal government directly compels states to administer federal regulatory programs, see generally Mikos, supra.

The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution establishes that federal law, treaties, and the Constitution itself are "the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. Accordingly, states and localities may be precluded from taking actions that are "preempted" by federal law, even if such actions are otherwise valid exercises of their police powers. See Hamilton v. Ky. Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 156 (1919) ("[W]hen the United States exerts any of the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution, no valid objection can be based upon the fact that such exercise may be attended by the same incidents which attend the exercise by a state of its police power, or that it may tend to accomplish a similar purpose."); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 291 (1981) ("The Court long ago rejected the suggestion that Congress invades areas reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment simply because it exercises its authority under the Commerce Clause in a manner that displaces the States' exercise of their police powers."). When Congress acts in an area in which it may preempt state activity in its entirety, it could also impose "preconditions to continued state regulation" in the otherwise preempted field. Printz, 521 U.S. at 926; New York, 505 U.S. at 173-74 ("Where federal regulation of private activity is within the scope of the Commerce Clause, we have recognized the ability of Congress to offer States the choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation.").

Printz, 521 U.S. at 935 ("We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. Today we hold that Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the States' officers directly."); New York, 505 U.S. at 175-76 (similar)

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Note that the phrase "general Welfare" does not exist in isolation in this clause, which might otherwise be seen to empower Congress to enact laws that broadly promote the general welfare of the nation. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 64 (1936) ("The view that the clause grants power to provide for the general welfare, independently of the taxing power, has never been authoritatively accepted."). Instead, the phrase "general Welfare" in Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, is tied to the preceding language in the clause regarding the raising of revenue, and thus requires Congress to spend the money it collects from taxation to promote the general welfare. See id. at 64 (holding that "the only thing granted [by the Taxing and Spending Clause] is the power to tax for the purpose of providing funds for payment of the nation's debts and making provision for the general welfare."). While this power is considerable, it is necessarily tied to spending legislation. See id.

South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).

See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603 (2012) ("Congress may attach appropriate conditions to federal ... spending programs to preserve its control over the use of federal funds.").

See, e.g., United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 229 (1980) (concerning provisions in appropriations acts that purported to eliminate annual pay raises for federal judges); United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554 (1940) (examining a provision in an appropriations act that restricted the funds available for payment of previously authorized bonuses for honorably discharged servicemen who re-enlisted into the Army).

See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2579 ("[I]n exercising its spending power, Congress may offer funds to the States, and may condition those offers on compliance with specified conditions."). It is important to note, however, that, as a general matter, entities that receive federal grant funds do not lose their rights as organizations to use their own, private resources for certain "political" activities (e.g., lobbying for legislative programs or changes, endorsing or contributing to political candidates or parties, voter registration or get-out-the-vote campaigns) as a consequence of receiving federal funds. The Supreme Court has opined that any attempts by the federal government to restrict private, nongovernmental entities from using their own nonfederal resources for such purposes would likely implicate fundamental rights protected by the First Amendment, including freedom of speech and the rights of association and petition. See, e.g., E. R.R.s President Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137-38 (1961); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953). For more information on this topic, see CRS Report RL34725, "Political" Activities of Private Recipients of Federal Grants or Contracts, by [author name scrubbed].

United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936). See also Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686 (1999) ("Congress may, in the exercise of its spending power, condition its grant of funds to the States upon their taking certain actions that Congress could not require them to take, and that acceptance of the funds entails an agreement to the actions.").

Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (citingCal. Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); and Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937)).

For more information regarding the various types of federal grants and federal agency administration of grant programs, see CRS Report R42769, Federal Grants-in-Aid Administration: A Primer, by [author name scrubbed].

Under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the President may determine the terms and conditions under which most forms of financial aid are provided to a foreign country or international organization. See generally CRS Report R40213, Foreign Aid: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].

Federal law defines a grant as "money, or property provided instead of money, that is paid or provided by the United States Government under a fixed annual or total authorization, to" eligible beneficiaries that include state and local governments as well as certain private nonprofit organizations. 31 U.S.C. § 6501(4)(A) and (B).

Grants 101, https://www.grants.gov/web/grants/learn-grants/grants-101.html (last visited: Mar. 13, 2017).

See Bennett v. Ky. Dep't of Educ., 470 U.S. 656, 669 (1985) ("[F]ederal grant programs originate in and remain governed by statutory provisions expressing the judgment of Congress concerning desirable public policy."); see also U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-06-382SP, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law 10-4 (3d ed. 2006) ("[A] federal grant is a form of assistance authorized by statute in which a federal agency (the grantor) transfers something of value to a party (the grantee) for a purpose, undertaking, or activity of the grantee that the government has chosen to assist. The "thing of value" is usually money, but may, depending on the program legislation, also include property or services. The grantee, again depending on the program legislation, may be a state or local government, a nonprofit organization, or a private individual or business entity.") (citations omitted).

31 U.S. C. § 6304 ("An executive agency shall use a grant agreement as the legal instrument reflecting a relationship between the United States Government and a State, a local government, or other recipient when (1) the principal purpose of the relationship is to transfer a thing of value to the State or local government or other recipient to carry out a public purpose of support or stimulation authorized by a law of the United States ... ; and (2) substantial involvement is not expected between the executive agency and the State, local government, or other recipient when carrying out the activity contemplated in the agreement.").

Grant Policies, "How Grant Policies Are Made," https://www.grants.gov/web/grants/learn-grants/grant-policies.html (last visited: Mar. 13, 2017).

Grant Terminology, definition of "formula grant," https://www.grants.gov/web/grants/learn-grants/grant-terminology.html#F (last visited: Mar. 13, 2017).

Grant Terminology, definition of "discretionary grant," https://www.grants.gov/web/grants/learn-grants/grant-terminology.html#D (last visited: Mar. 13, 2017).

See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 10006(b) ("The Secretary shall determine which States receive grants under this section, and the amount of those grants, on the basis of information provided in State applications under section 14005 and such other criteria as the Secretary determines appropriate, which may include a State's need for assistance to help meet the objective of paragraphs (2), (3), (4), (5) or (6) of section 14005(d).").

2 C.F.R. § 200.205(c)(5).

Id.

For example, the Department of Justice's Office of Justice Programs, which oversees federal grants to state and local jurisdictions under the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) program, issued a brief "guidance" document in October 2016 that clarified that grant applicants must certify their compliance with the immigration statute codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1373. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Additional Guidance Regarding Compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373(Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.bja.gov/funding/Additional-BJA-Guidance-on-Section-1373-October-6-2016.pdf ("Authorizing legislation for the Byrne/JAG grant program requires that all grant applicants certify compliance both with the provisions of that authorizing legislation and all other applicable federal laws. The Office of Justice Programs has determined that 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (Section 1373) is an applicable federal law under the Byrne/JAG authorizing legislation. Therefore, all Byrne/JAG grant applicants must certify compliance with all applicable federal laws, including Section 1373, as part of the Byrne/JAG grant application process.").

Federal agencies that administer grant programs may monitor recipients for compliance with grant conditions and terminate and recoup funding in the event of noncompliance. See, e.g.,Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 790-91 (1983) ("Requiring States to honor the obligations voluntarily assumed as a condition of federal funding before recognizing their ownership of funds simply does not intrude on their sovereignty. The State chose to participate in the Title I program and, as a condition of receiving the grant, freely gave its assurances that it would abide by the conditions of Title I.... [T]he State failed to fulfill those assurances, and it therefore became liable for the funds misused, as the grant specified.").

OMB Guidelines to Agencies on Governmentwide Debarment and Suspension (Nonprocurement Programs and Activities), 2 C.F.R. Part 180.

The Supreme Court has indicated that "courts should defer substantially to the judgment of Congress" when determining whether a spending program advances the general welfare. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (citingHelvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640, 645 (1937)). The Court has even questioned whether the general welfare restriction may be enforced by the courts. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 n.2 (1987) ("The level of deference to the congressional decision is such that the Court has more recently questioned whether 'general welfare' is a judicially enforceable restriction at all..").

South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).

See supra note 37.

Dole, 483 U.S. at 207, 211.

451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981); see also Planned Parenthood of Kan. & Mid-Mo. v. Moser, 747 F.3d 814, 825-26 (10th Cir. 2014)("In the federal-grant context, the State is more a partner than a subordinate of the federal government, and this relationship limits the authority of the courts to devise remedies. The State should be informed of what its burdens are before it accepts the federal funds and assumes the concomitant responsibilities.").

Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 25.

Id.

Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012).

P.L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (Mar. 23, 2010).

42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII).

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605.

Id. at 2605-06 ("The original [Medicaid] program was designed to cover medical services for four particular categories of the needy: the disabled, the blind, the elderly, and needy families with dependent children. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10). Previous amendments to Medicaid eligibility merely altered and expanded the boundaries of these categories. Under the Affordable Care Act, Medicaid is transformed into a program to meet the health care needs of the entire nonelderly population with income below 133 percent of the poverty level.").

Id. at 2606.

Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality opinion)). See also Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958).

Dole, 483 U.S. at 209 n.3 ("Our cases have not required that we define the outer bounds of the 'germaneness' or 'relatedness' limitation on the imposition of conditions under the spending power.... Because petitioner has not sought such a restriction ... and because we find any such limitation on conditional federal grants satisfied in this case in any event, we do not address whether conditions less directly related to the particular purpose of the expenditure might be outside the bounds of the spending power.").

New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992).

Barbour v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 374 F.3d 1161, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

Codified in 23 U.S.C. § 158.

Dole, 483 U.S. at 208 (citation omitted).

Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012) (describing Dole, 483 U.S. at 208).

Id. (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at 208) (quotations omitted).

Dole, 483 U.S. at 218 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). ("The only possible connection, highway safety, has nothing to do with how the funds Congress has appropriated are expended. Rather than a condition determining how federal highway money shall be expended, it is a regulation determining who shall be able to drink liquor. As such it is not justified by the spending power.").

Id. at 215.

Dole, 483 U.S. at 210-11.

Id.; see also United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 214 (2003) (holding that the Children's Internet Protection Act, which requires public libraries that receive federal funds to install Internet filtering software on their computers, did not induce libraries to violate the First Amendment).

570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013).

Id. at 2322.

Id. at 2324.

Id.

Id. at 2327.

Id. at 2332. For more on this decision, see CRS Report R43027, Restrictions on the Speech of Recipients of Federal Funds Under the Leadership Act of 2003: United States Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society, by [author name scrubbed].

South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).

Id. at 211. The NFIB Court also noted that, in the Dole case, "the federal funds at stake constituted less than half of one percent of South Dakota's budget at the time." Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012).

Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 ("When we consider, for a moment, that all South Dakota would lose if she adheres to her chosen course as to a suitable minimum drinking age is 5% of the funds otherwise obtainable under specified highway grant programs, the argument as to coercion is shown to be more rhetoric than fact.").

Id.

567 U.S. 519, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).

P.L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (Mar. 23, 2010).

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2601.

In NFIB, seven Justices held that the requirement that states either comply with the requirements of the Medicaid expansion under the ACA or lose all Medicaid funds violated the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 2608. However, these seven Justices either all wrote or joined one of two separate opinions on this issue, and did not join in either the reasoning or judgment of the other opinion. The opinion of Chief Justice Roberts, which was joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan, appears to be significantly narrower than the dissenting opinion authored by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, and is thus would generally thus be seen as controlling. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) ("When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds'") (citation omitted).

Id. at 2604-05. The Court went on to hold, however, that the remedy was to sever that enforcement mechanism, effectively making state participation in the Medicaid expansion voluntary. Id. at 2607.

Id. at 2605-06.

Id. at 2606 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 591 (1937)).

Id. at 2604-05.

South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 209 n.3 (1987).

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604, 2606 ("The Court in Steward Machine did not attempt to 'fix the outermost line' where persuasion gives way to coercion. 301 U.S., at 591. The Court found it '[e]nough for present purposes that wherever the line may be, this statute is within it.' Ibid. We have no need to fix a line either. It is enough for today that wherever that line may be, this statute is surely beyond it."); Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 ("Our decisions have recognized that in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion.' Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, supra, at 590. Here, however, Congress has directed only that a State desiring to establish a minimum drinking age lower than 21 lose a relatively small percentage of certain federal highway funds.... When we consider, for a moment, that all South Dakota would lose if she adheres to her chosen course as to a suitable minimum drinking age is 5% of the funds otherwise obtainable under specified highway grant programs, the argument as to coercion is shown to be more rhetoric than fact.").

Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799 (Jan. 30, 2017).

As used here, the term "unauthorized alien" refers to any alien who entered or remained in the United States in violation of federal immigration law and whose continued presence in the country has not been sanctioned by federal immigration officials.

82 Fed. Reg. at 8,801.

The statute also provides that no person or agency may prohibit a federal, state, or local government entity from
(1) sending information regarding immigration status to, or requesting information from, federal immigration authorities; (2) maintaining information regarding immigration status; or (3) exchanging such information with any other federal, state, or local government entity. 8 U.S.C. § 1373.

For an examination of some of these issues, see CRS Report R44795, State and Local "Sanctuary" Policies Limiting Participation in Immigration Enforcement, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG1741, Plan to Restrict Federal Grants to "Sanctuary Jurisdictions" Raises Legal Questions, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Insight IN10653, Sanctuary Jurisdictions: Congressional Action and President Trump's Interior Enforcement Executive Order, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R44789, Sanctuary Jurisdictions and Select Federal Grant Funding Issues: In Brief, by [author name scrubbed].

Amended Compl., City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Trump (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2017) (No. 3:17-cv-00485), https://www.sfcityattorney.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/SF-v-Trump-Amended-Complaint-1.pdf (last visited: Mar. 21, 2017).

Compl., Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump (N.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2017) (No. 5:17-cv-00574), https://www.sccgov.org/sites/opa/nr/Documents/Complaint%20-%20Filed.pdf (last visited: Mar. 21, 2017).

City of Chelsea, City of Lawrence v. Trump (D. Mass. Feb. 8, 2017) (No. 1:17-cv-10214), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3456943/Chelsea-Lawrence-Complaint-Sanctuary-Cities.pdf (last visited: Mar. 21, 2017).

Amended Compl., City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Trump (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2017) (No. 3:17-cv-00485), at 4, 22-23.

Id. at 23 (quoting Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605(2012)).

Id. at 34-35 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Under the ripeness doctrine, claims are not justiciable until they are "ripe for adjudication." See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998); Planned Parenthood of Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Gee, 837 F.3d 477, 488 (5th Cir. 2016). In other words, there is no Article III "case or controversy" for a court to decide if the asserted claim "rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all." Texas, 523 U.S. at 300; see also Reddy v. Foster, 845 F.3d 493, 500 (1st Cir. 2017).

Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 17, No. 3:17-cv-00574-WHO (copy on file with the author).

What type of grant is given to a state by the federal government?

What is an example of a block grant?

What's an example of a categorical grant?

What is an example of a formula grant?