THE AUDITOR’S LIABILITY Show
“They [Arthur Andersen] can never clear their name. In the court of public opinion, they have been tried, convicted and hanged. After WorldCom, there was just nothing you could say." Lynn Turner, Former Chief Accountant, Securities and Exchange Commission (US), in June 2002 1.0 The auditor is accountable to those who appointed her of his conduct while making his report on the audit .She has to assess whether management to the entity has carried out its fiduciary responsibility in a manner acceptable to owners the business and to improve the accountability in the manner acceptable to the owners of the business. 1.2 The auditors liability is in two folds”
The former is owed to state and the other to individuals who have suffered loss as a result of audit shortcomings. 1.3 Generally
1.4 Liabilities to the state are likely to be “fixed in terms of penalties whereas the liabilities to the clients or third parties have been proven to be open –ended. 1.5 The auditors are seeking to have the courts allocate blame for the corporate collapse on the basis of actual responsibility rather than the present system where by the deepest pocket carries the heaviest (usually the only) burden. 1.6 In summary: Contract client-mgt investors Auditor No formal contract third parties users 1.7 Whilst an auditor has various statutory duties to perform. There are also non –statutory dutiesto consider the most important of these being the duty to exercise reasonable care and skill in conduct of an audit examination. This duty was clearly expressed in the of cited Re-Kingston Cotton Mill (1986) and Re- London and General bank (1895). The auditor’s duties may be summarized as follows:
1.8 auditor of a limited company are bound to know (ie required to know ) or make themselves acquitted with their duties under the articles of the company, whose accounts they are appointed to audit, and under the companies Acts for the time being in force. 1.9 Auditors of enterprise such as nationalized industries or local authorities would also be subject to these duties and other duties
2.1 As a self-protection exercise the prudent auditor should always explain any limitation through the medium o the audit report and should always clarify in advance the nature of the work to be undertaken. This can vary from a full “audit “ engagement (where the auditor express opinion as to the truth and fairness of the financial statements to a “review engagement” (where only limited assurance is provided)
2.2 Reasonable care and skillThe more the specialized the work undertaken, the higher the degree of skill and care expected. Generally in the Re-London and General Bank, the duty of reasonable care and skill; she must be honest ie she must not certify what she does not believe to be true and she must take reasonable care and skill before she believes what she certifies is true, what is reasonable care in any particular case must depend upon the circumstances of that case. 2.3 In Re- Kingston Cotton Mill (1896) gives one hint on how the profession should set about determining the meaning of “reasonable care and skill; it is a duty of an auditor to bring to bear on the work she has to perform that skill, care and caution which a reasonably competent, careful and cautious auditor would use. 2.4 An auditor is not bound to be detective or to approach his work with suspicion or with forgone conclusion that there is something wrong .She is a watchdog and not a bloodhound. 2.5 This anticipates by more than half a century the Maultz and Sharaf (1962) auditing postulates which states that; as a working assumption;’ the financial statements and other information submitted for verification are free from collusive and other unusual Irregularities. 2.6 Auditors must not be made liable for not tracking out ingenious and carefully laid schemes of fraud where they’re nothing there to arouse their suspicion. 2.7 But when suspicions is aroused the auditor who does not respond by following through the suspicious circumstances in order to full resolve the matter may be liable for negligence ( Thomas Gerrard case). 2.8 Auditing standard and guidelines do not carry statutory power but they must be considered to be persuasive evidence” as to which and auditing procedures constitute best practice. Auditors should institute quality control measures to ensure that their audits (of whatever size) live up to the description of best practices such procedures include
2.9 Adherence to accounting (as opposed to auditing) standards raises the further possibility of debate over what constitute “reasonable care and skill”, the proof of compliance with generally accepted (accounting principles (GAAP;s ) as persuasive but not conclusive evidence’ the financial accounts show a true and fair view. Thus the auditors who simply ensure compliance with GAAPs and fail to examine the broader question of the truth and fairness may not be carrying out their duty with reasonable degree of skill and care. 3.0 The auditor’s liability in contract (privity of contract) for negligent work will depend on client’s ability to (firstly) prove negligence and (Secondly ) prove actual loss. Auditors negligence will be judged according to accepted standards of reasonable care and skill and these in turn will be judged according to the extend to which the audit or followed according to the extent to which the audit or followed accepted best practice (approved auditing standards) YET NEVERTHERLESS RETAINED A professional independence and flexibility which ensured that the ultimate slavish compliance with published professional guidance. 3.1 Generally the auditor will be liable whenever
3.2 But if some one less closely to the auditor and with whom no formal contractual relationship can be said to exist, but such cases is where the auditor duty of care takes place. In more remote third parties such as ;
3.3 Factors for liability to third party by auditor may established
3.4 Cases law for doctrine of auditor third party liabilities3.4.1.Candler V Crane, Christmas and Co (UK, 1951) In this case it was held that there could be no auditor liability for negligence in absence of contractual relationship. Lord Denning delivered a dissenting opinion based on the argument that actual fore knowledge of the specific use to which the accounts would be put created a duty of care even in the absence of a formal contract between the accountant and the third party. 3.4.2 .Hedley Byrne V Heller and partners ( UK, 1963) in this non- accounting case a reference was issued in the for knowledge that it would be relied upon by third party, for loan or investment purposes. The reference proved “unreliable “ and the issues of the reference were proved unreliable and the issuers of the reference were sued. It was held that because of that very foreknowledge a duty care existed towards and third party. Despite the absence of any formal contract Thus Lord Denning’s dissenting decision in Candler V Cranes Christmas and Co was vindicated. The relevance of this case for accountants (rather than as auditors),they often prepare special reports for a client in full knowledge that those reports or accounts are going to be used to persuade and identifiable third part ( a bank or prospective purchaser) to adopt a certain cause of action .The Hedley Byrene is often used to represent very narrow view of auditors liability to third parties – Actual knowledge of possible reliance being a necessary condition. 3.4.3.Caparo Industries Vs Dickman and others (1990) In 1984 Caparo industries purchased 100,000 Fidelity shares in the open market .On June 12,1984, the date which the accounts (audited by Touch Ross) were published, they purchased a further 50,000 shares relying on information in the accounts, further shares where acquired. On September 4, Caparo made a bid for remainder and by October had acquired control of Fidelity. Caparo alleged that accounts on which they had relied where misleading in that an apparent pre- tax profit of the some $1.3 m should in fact be reported as a loss of $ 400,000. The plaintiff argued that Touch owed a duty of care to investors and potential investors Held:
Conclusion: though the above seems to lessen auditors duty to use skill and care because auditors are still fully liable in negligence to the companies they audit and their shareholders collectively. 3.4.4. Utramares Corpn V Touche (USA, 1930) The auditors should not be made liable for an indeterminate amount to an indeterminate class of people ,for indeterminate period of time. Some aspects of this view seem to be more acceptable than others. For example most people would agree that, as time passes after the publication of a set of audited accounts, less and less reliance can be placed of audited accounts, less and less reliance can be placed on them by the users because under lying economic factors may have changed significantly. Thus in determining the auditor’s liability the question the time reliance was placed would be a material consideration. With respect to the likely classes of users there are three possible schools of thought:
When reporting on the statutory accounts the auditor reports to the members of the company but the audit reports to the members of the company but the audit report enters the public domain and becomes an important source of assurance to any third party considering entering into financial arrangement with the client company. The auditors duty of care should thus extend beyond shareholders and identifiable third parties who belong to a class likely to rely on financial statements for a purpose which can justifiably be argued to be a reasonable purpose for a person of that class. All this is within timing constraints. ConclusionThe ultramares case suggests the need for some limitation of liability but does not itself provide precise criteria .The concept has been reinforced by Caparo case. Caparo has taken Ultramares decision one step further by placing strict limits on the perceived purpose of the auditors report itself, in turn limiting the opportunity for third parties to establish that a duty of care exists between the auditor and themselves. In many ways, auditors liability is not materially different concept from manufacturer liability for products(DonoghueV stephnson( UK ,1932) 3.4.5. JEBB Fastener’s Vs Mark Bloom Despite the fact that the auditors were not aware of a bid for the client company at the time they signed the audit report they would have been liable to the acquirer for the losses suffered had it not been accepted by the court that the plaintiff would have gone ahead and bought the company whatever he picture provided by financial statements. Clearly, in the view of the court prospective purchasers constituted a “reasonably foreseeable group of users, and the auditors would have been well advised to bear them in mind when programming their audit and considering the overall truth and fairness of accounts. It is a case where the “reasonable foresight’ test was accepted and auditors, as a result found themselves liable to third parties who where complete strangers to them at the time the audit took place. Whether the defendant auditors knew or reasonably should have foreseen sat the time the accounts for the purpose of deciding whether or not to take over the company, and therefore could suffer loss if the accounts were inaccurate. 3.4.6. Two-max Ltd and Goode V Dickson, Mc Farlane and Robinson( UK,1982) This case provided an immediate reinforcement of the judge’s decision in the JEBB Fasteners. The only deferent being that of judge believed that the plaintiff would not have acquired the company under consideration had the accounts actually shown a true fair view . The judge in this case commended JEBB Fasteners decision on the grounds that it “combined the simplicity of the proximity or neighbor principle with a limitation which has regard to the warning. ( see Ultra mares V Touche) against exposing the accounts to interminable liability. Without disagreeing with the basic principle that the auditors had a duty to exercise “reasonable foresight” in carrying out their work. 3.4.7. Al Saudi Banque ( and others ) Vs Clarke Pixley ( UK ,1989) In this case it was held that : The auditors of a company owe no duty of care to a bank who lends money to the company, regardless of whether the bank is an existing creditor ( at the time of the audit report signed) making further advances or is only a potential creditor of the company, since either case even if it is foreseable that the bank might request a copy of company’s accounts and rely on them when making an advance to the company there is not a sufficiently close relationship between the auditors and the bank to give rise to the degree of proximity necessary to establish a duty of care ConclusionWhen suing an auditor for negligence it is first has to be established that a duty of care exists. The JEBB Fastener case had appeared to widen the proximity circle by holding auditors liable to the unknown third parties on the basis of a “ reasonable foresight’. The Al Saudi Banque , case and the Caparo case rejects this approach as being to open ended .They proceed to the precedents established in both the crane Christmas and the Hedley Byrne cases. That actual knowledge of an intention to rely on the accounts should constitute the primary test of Proximity” With regards to the banks who were limited class the judge commended ‘they were limited class , and their identity and the amount of their exposure was know to defendants when they signed their reports. But their position is not all comparable with that of the members. They played no part in appointing the defendants auditors. The defendants were under no statutory obligation to report to them, nor did they send them to the company with the intention or in the knowledge that they would be supplied to them. The judge added that in order to establish sufficiently proximate relationship between parties
The basic ground rules for establishing a duty of care owed to a third party are;
3.5 Liability for negligence may either ordinary or gross . Ordinary negligence refers to lack of reasonable care, eg an auditor who fail together sufficient competent evidence to support the figure of stock in the balance sheet might be accused of ordinary negligence by an injured party if all other phase of the audit conformed to generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS). On the other hand, gross negligence refers to lack of even the slightest care or reckless disregard of duty (constructive fraud i.e misrepresentation of facts). For example where the auditor fails substantially to comply with GAAS , the auditor may be charged by an aggrieved party. The auditors protects themselves by using
3.6 Further consideration of potential liability
This is a result of breach of trust (Misfeasance), which is improper execution of some lawful act. It arises where the auditor fails to do something, which is correct (e.g. failure by the auditor to discharge his fiduciary duty under contract) Conditions to be met for this liability
Relevant cases
In companies Act No.12 of 2002, the auditor may be sued under miscellaneous offences. if the auditor , in a nay turn, report or certificate or balance sheet , willfully make a statement false in any material particular , knowing it to be false , he shall be quilt of an offence and shall be liable on conviction for not more than 3 years with or without hard labour and shall also be liable to fine in lieu of or in addition to such imprisonment as aforesaid 3.7 Liability under other Acts
The auditor can be guilt of a criminal offence under this Act if she aided or abetted management to publish false statements with intent to defraud stakeholders
Any person, by statement, promise or forecast, which he knows to be misleading, false or deceptive or by dishonesty concealment of material facts, or by reckless making of any statement, promise or forecast which is misleading, false or deceptive induces or attempt to induce others for acquiring, disposing , subscribing for, or underwriting security shall be guilty of an offence and liable to penal servitude for a term not exceeding seven years. Also see the prevention of corruption Act No. 6 of 1971 for corrupt practices (this will be studied in Frauds topic) 3.7 Liability under professional misconduct
( disciplinary Actions)
In this case it was reported by a local daily that the company has suffered losses of over Tzs 60,000,000/-(sixty million)in local and foreign currency during the period of 10 months, through forgery and under pricing of crops. The auditors (TAC) were appointed to establish the correctness of the newspaper report. TAC appointed a team headed by prosecution witness to carry out the audit. The exercise culminated into an audit report confirming Irregularities reported by press. The case is relevant to study because if the Audit report was to be proved unreliable in that it was negligently prepared in course of investigation, then there could have been auditors liability In the special audit report the honorable judge said the special report was unprofessional and failed to comply with accounting standard (TSSAPs)-TFAS-IFAS 4.0 AUDITORS LIABILITY, EXPECTATION GAP AND DEEP POCKET SYNDROME4.1 The public opinion has become very important in determining what is expected by auditor’s day-to-day practice. Aggressive litigation is a strong driving force behind changes in professional recommendation is to what constituter ‘best practice’. The expectation gap, which is expected to exist, is instrumental in leading to legal actions against auditors. The gap lies between interpretations of their duty as independent auditors and client/shareholders interpretation of that duty.
4.2 The gap can either be liability, performance or standards gap depending on circumstances. 4.3 Anti- Auditor litigation is also blamed on the ‘deep pocket syndrome’. This means that in the wake of a corporate collapse or significant audit failure, creditors or plaintiffs often look to see which professional advisors involved have the deepest pocket’ in terms of professional indemnity insurance. They may then launch an action against those advisors despite an absence of any good evidence that the advisor was actually negligent. 4.4 Auditors duty of confidentialityIs an implied term of an accountant’s contract with a client. For this reason an accountant should not, as a general rule, disclose to the other persons, against the clients wishes, information about the client’s affairs acquired during and as a result of their professional relationship. An accountant or auditor who becomes aware that a client has committed default or an unlawful act is normally under no obligation to disclose what she knows to external authorities. But some circumstance may allow eg. Terrorist actions and money laundering as required by statute. The auditors have no direct statutory responsibility to detect and reporting fraud, error and other irregularities but the ISA suggest that “audit procedures should be designed to give an auditor a reasonable chance of detecting any material misstatement .The standard goes on to suggest how the auditor should approach the design of the audit work through adequate planning. 4.5 Auditors liability- Risk minimization techniques for potential claim/litigation against an auditor
NB: SEE THE ATTACHMENT B ON ENRON CASE AND LESSON LEARNED Questions See addition multiple choice questions from http://www.kaplancpareview.com/resources/practice_questions.php
Under what circumstances might the auditor be liable to the third party?The auditor will only be liable to third parties if he or she knows (rather than merely foresees) that the information will be given to, and used by, someone other than those for whom it is prepared.
What are the legal liabilities of auditors under common law?Under common law, an auditor can be held liable to its clients for negligence, gross negligence, con- structive fraud, and fraud. Due to the substantive amount of damages that a client can collect in a tort action, clients of auditors would be well advised to gear into tort claims rather than contractual ones.
What are the policy reasons for holding accountants liable to third parties with whom they are not in privity?In summary, Ultramares held: (1) an accountant would be liable to a third party not in privity for negligence if the party was actually foreseen and was the end and aim of the transaction; (2) an accountant would be liable to a third party not in privity for deceit and fraudulent misrepresentation, without proof of ...
How an engagement letter might affect an auditor's liability to clients under common law?An engagement letter from the auditor to the client specifies the responsibilities of both parties and states such matters as fee arrangements and deadlines for completion. The auditor may also use this as an opportunity to inform the client that the responsibility for the prevention of fraud is that of the client.
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