Read Online (Free) relies on page scans, which are not currently available to screen readers. To access this article, please contact JSTOR User Support . We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.
With a personal account, you can read up to 100 articles each month for free.
Get StartedAlready have an account? Log in
Monthly Plan
- Access everything in the JPASS collection
- Read the full-text of every article
- Download up to 10 article PDFs to save and keep
Yearly Plan
- Access everything in the JPASS collection
- Read the full-text of every article
- Download up to 120 article PDFs to save and keep
Log in through your institution
Purchase a PDF
Purchase this article for $41.50 USD.
How does it work?
- Select the purchase option.
- Check out using a credit card or bank account with PayPal.
- Read your article online and download the PDF from your email or your account.
journal article
Anti-Trust (Anti-Monopoly) Policy and Application 1920-1929The American Economist
Vol. 4, No. 2 (Nov., 1960)
, pp. 9-20 (12 pages)
Published By: Sage Publications, Inc.
//www.jstor.org/stable/25602545
Read and download
Log in through your school or library
Alternate access options
For independent researchers
Read Online
Read 100 articles/month free
Subscribe to JPASS
Unlimited reading + 10 downloads
Purchase article
$41.50 - Download now and later
Journal Information
The American Economist is a leading refereed journal published by the International Honor Society in Economics – Omicron Delta Epsilon – for the enhancement of research in economics. It publishes articles in all areas of economics, particularly in economic education. The Journal publishes a combination of theoretical and empirical articles as well as shorter notes, book reviews and comments on published papers.
Publisher Information
Sara Miller McCune founded SAGE Publishing in 1965 to support the dissemination of usable knowledge and educate a global community. SAGE is a leading international provider of innovative, high-quality content publishing more than 900 journals and over 800 new books each year, spanning a wide range of subject areas. A growing selection of library products includes archives, data, case studies and video. SAGE remains majority owned by our founder and after her lifetime will become owned by a charitable trust that secures the company’s continued independence. Principal offices are located in Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore, Washington DC and Melbourne. www.sagepublishing.com
Rights & Usage
This item is part of a JSTOR Collection.
For terms and use, please refer to our Terms and Conditions
The American Economist © 1960
Sage Publications, Inc.
Request Permissions
- Opinions
- Syllabus
- Case
Disclaimer: Official Supreme Court case law is only found in the print version of the United States Reports. Justia case law is provided for general informational purposes only, and may not reflect current legal developments, verdicts or settlements. We make no warranties or guarantees about the accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of the information contained on this site or information linked to from this site. Please check official sources.
Justia Annotations is a forum for attorneys to summarize, comment on, and analyze case law published on our site. Justia makes no guarantees or warranties that the annotations are accurate or reflect the current state of law, and no annotation is intended to be, nor should it be construed as, legal advice. Contacting Justia or any attorney through this site, via web form, email, or otherwise, does not create an attorney-client relationship.
On February 4, 1887, both the Senate and House passed the Interstate Commerce Act, which applied the Constitution’s “Commerce Clause”—granting Congress the power “to Regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States”—to regulating railroad rates. Small businesses and farmers were protesting that the railroads charged them higher rates than larger corporations, and that the railroads were also setting higher rates for short hauls than for long-distance hauls. Although the railroads claimed economic justification for policies that favored big businesses, small shippers insisted that the railroads were gouging them.
It took years for Congress to respond to these protests, due to members’ reluctance to have the government interfere in any way with corporate policies. In 1874 legislation was introduced calling for a federal railroad commission. The bill passed the House, but not the Senate. When Congress failed to act, some states adopted their own railroad regulations. Those laws were struck down in 1886, when the Supreme Court ruled in Wabash v. Illinois that the state of Illinois could not restrict the rates that the Wabash Railroad was charging because its freight traffic moved between the states, and only the federal government could regulate interstate commerce. Continued public anger over unfair railroad rates prompted Illinois senator Shelby M. Cullom to hold the hearings that led to the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act.
That law limited railroads to rates that were “reasonable and just,” forbade rebates to high-volume users, and made it illegal to charge higher rates for shorter hauls. To hear evidence and render decisions on individual cases, the act created the Interstate Commerce Commission. This was the first federal independent regulatory commission, and it served as a model for others that would follow, from the Federal Trade Commission to the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Consumer Product Safety Commission.
Evolving technology eventually made the purpose of the ICC obsolete, and in 1995 Congress abolished the commission, transferring its remaining functions to the Surface Transportation Board. But while the ICC has come and gone, its creation marked a significant turning point in federal policy. Before 1887, Congress had applied the Commerce Clause only on a limited basis, usually to remove barriers that the states tried to impose on interstate trade. The Interstate Commerce Act showed that Congress could apply the Commerce Clause more expansively to national issues if they involved commerce across state lines. After 1887, the national economy grew much more integrated, making almost all commerce interstate and international. The nation rather than the Constitution had changed. That development turned the Commerce Clause into a powerful legislative tool for addressing national problems.