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Abstract
The history of the concept of natural selection has generally been traced back through the personal development of Charles Darwin to Thomas Malthus, whose Essay on the Principles of Population gave Darwin the clue which led him to formulate the doctrine. Actually the conception of natural selection is very old, although originally it was not used to explain the origin of new species (evolution) but to account for the existence of adaptation. The survival of the fit organism, of course, implies the survival of fitness itself, and thus natural selection can serve as an alternative explanation of those facts which are generally cited as evidences of teleology. Natural selection was used for this purpose by Empedocles (400 B. C.), Lucretius (99-55 B. C), Diderot (1749), Maupertius (1756), and Geoffrey St. Hillaire (1833); but it was specifically rejected in favor of teleology by Aristotle (384-321 B. C.), Lactantius (260-340 A. D.), St. Albertus Magnus (1236), and Whewell (1833). Natural selection was used to explain organic evolution by Wells (1813), Matthews (1831), Darwin (1858), and Wallace (1858). As an explanation of evolution, natural selection involves a number of distinct though subordinate propositions, such as the existence of heritable variations, of population pressure, of a struggle for existence and the consequent survival of the fit or better adapted. A number of philosophers and naturalists recognized the validity of one or more of these propositions without however, gaining any clear conception of the implications of the whole doctrine. One such component, population pressure, was described by Hale (1677), Buffon (1751), Benjamin Franklin (1751), Bonnet (1764), Monboddo (1773), Herder (1784), Smellie (1790), Malthus (1798), Prichard (1808), Wells (1813), Matthews (1831), De Candolle (1833), Lyell (1833), Geoffrey St. Hillaire (1833), and Spencer (1852). The struggle for existence was described by al-Jâhiz (9th cent.), Hobbes (1651), Hale (1677), Buffon (1751), Monboddo (1773), Kant (1775), Herder (1784), Smellie (1790), Erasmus Darwin, (1794) Wells (1813), De Candolle (1832), Lyell (1833), and Spencer (1852). Several eighteenth and nineteenth century scientists almost grasped the full significance of natural selection but just failed to recognize all of its implications. Among these were Rousseau (1749), Prichard (1808, 1826), Lawrence (1819), Geoffrey St. Hillaire (1833), Herbert (1837), Spencer (1852), and Naudin (1852).
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The Proceedings journal contains papers that have been read before the members of the American Philosophical Society at meetings held in April and November. The papers sometimes are given as part of a topical symposium. In addition, articles that have been submitted by outside authors, reviewed by qualified scholars in the particular fields of study, and accepted for publication by the Committee on Publications, are published. Proceedings articles generally are 30 pages in length or less, although exceptions are made. The Proceedings journal also contains biographical memoirs of deceased members of the Society.
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Society © 1941 American Philosophical Society
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Abstract
This essay traces the interlinked origins of two concepts found in Charles Darwin's writings: "unconscious selection," and sexual selection as applied to humanity's anatomical race distinctions. Unconscious selection constituted a significant elaboration of Darwin's artificial selection analogy. As originally conceived in his theoretical notebooks, that analogy had focused exclusively on what Darwin later would call "methodical selection," the calculated production of desired changes in domestic breeds. By contrast, unconscious selection produced its results unintentionally and at a much slower pace. Inspiration for this concept likely came from Darwin's early reading of works on both animal breeding and physical ethnology. Texts in these fields described the slow and unplanned divergence of anatomical types, whether animal or human, under the guidance of contrasting ideals of physical perfection. These readings, it is argued, also led Darwin to his theory of sexual selection as applied to race, a theme he discussed mainly in his book The Descent of Man (1871). There Darwin described how the racial version of sexual selection operated on the same principle as unconscious selection. He thereby effectively reunited these kindred concepts.
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The Journal of the History of Biology is devoted to the history of the biological sciences, with additional interest and concern in philosophical and social issues confronting biology. While all historical epochs are welcome, particular attention has been paid in recent years to developments during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The journal serves both the working biologist who needs a full understanding to the historical and philosophical bases of the field and the historian of biology interested in following developments in the biological sciences.
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Springer is one of the leading international scientific publishing companies, publishing over 1,200 journals and more than 3,000 new books annually, covering a wide range of subjects including biomedicine and the life sciences, clinical medicine, physics, engineering, mathematics, computer sciences, and economics.
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Journal of the History of Biology © 2007 Springer
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