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journal article
Defamation Suits as a Weapon in Corporate Control BattlesThe Business Lawyer
Vol. 37, No. 1 (November 1981)
, pp. 1-25 (25 pages)
Published By: American Bar Association
//www.jstor.org/stable/40686342
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Journal Information
The Business Lawyer is the premier business law journal in the country, circulating to approximately 60,000 readers. It contains articles of significant interest to the business lawyer, including case law analysis, developing trends and annotated listings of recent literature.
Publisher Information
With nearly 400,000 members, the ABA provides law school accreditation, continuing legal education, information about the law, programs to assist lawyers and judges in their work, and initiatives to improve the legal system for the public.
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The Business Lawyer © 1981 American
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Annotation
Primary Holding
To sustain a claim of defamation or libel, the First Amendment requires that the plaintiff show that the defendant knew that a statement was false or was reckless in deciding to publish the information without investigating whether it was accurate.
Facts
During the Civil Rights movement of the mid-20th century, the New York Times published a full-page ad for contributing donations to defend Martin Luther King, Jr. on perjury charges. The ad contained several minor factual inaccuracies, such as the number of times that King had been arrested and actions taken by the Montgomery, Alabama police. The city Public Safety commissioner, L.B. Sullivan, felt that the criticism of his subordinates reflected on him, even though he was not mentioned in the ad. Sullivan sent a written request to the Times to publicly retract the information, as required for a public figure to seek punitive damages in a libel action under Alabama law.
When the Times refused and claimed that they were puzzled by the request, Sullivan filed his libel action against the Times and a group of African-American ministers mentioned in the ad. A jury in state court awarded him $500,000 in damages. Curiously, the Times did eventually retract the ad's statements when Alabama Governor John Patterson demanded it. The newspaper felt that, while Patterson also was not named in the ad, its comments reflected more directly on him because he represented the state of Alabama generally.
Opinions
Majority
- William Joseph Brennan, Jr. (Author)
- Earl Warren
- Tom C. Clark
- John Marshall Harlan II
- Potter Stewart
- Byron Raymond White
Brennan held that the First Amendment did not permit a finding of liability by Alabama courts in this context, especially considering the modest evidence that had been presented. When a statement concerns a public figure, according to Brennan, it is not enough to show that it is false for the press to be liable for libel. Instead, the target of the statement must show that it was made with knowledge of or reckless disregard for its falsity. Brennan used the term "actual malice" to summarize this standard, although he did not intend the usual meaning of a malicious purpose. "Malice" had a long-standing meaning within libel law that limited it to knowledge or gross recklessness rather than intent, since courts found it difficult to imagine that someone would knowingly disseminate false information without a bad intent. However, it previously had been used only to determine whether enhanced penalties, such as punitive damages, should be awarded.
Concurrence
- Hugo Lafayette Black (Author)
- William Orville Douglas
While he agreed with the majority's reasoning, Black felt that the actual malice standard did not go far enough in providing First Amendment protections. He argued that it was not clear enough to be consistently applied.
Concurrence
- Arthur Joseph Goldberg (Author)
- William Orville Douglas
Case Commentary
This case clarified the scope of First Amendment protection for speech on matters of public concern, resolving a disagreement among lower courts as to whether it extended beyond opinion and comment to good-faith statements that proved to be factually and objectively false. In deciding that it did, the Supreme Court gave substantial protections to defendants such as newspapers and other media outlets by raising the burden of proof required for plaintiffs in libel claims.
Another, less familiar development associated with this case is the burden shifting from the defendant proving that the statement was true, as was traditionally done in defamation cases, to the plaintiff proving that the statement was false. Great Britain continues to adhere to the traditional rule, while Australia has followed the U.S. in making the shift.